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The paper analyzes the fair privilege issued by the Aquileian patriarch Bertrand de Saint-Geniès 
to the commune of Buzet. It is argued that the charter had several mutually complimentary pur-
poses that come to light only when contextualized within Bertrand’s overall political program. By 
comparing the document with similar market privileges issued by the patriarch throughout his 
turbulent reign, the author argues that the charter to Buzet had both economic and political im-
plications. On the one hand, the privilege forms a part of the series of charters designed to bolster 
the volume of trade and the income from highway tolls throughout the Patriarchate, while at the 
same time fostering symbiotic ties between the central government and the subject community 
receiving the grant. Finally, the paper discusses the administrative structure of the Margraviate of 
Istria as revealed in the privilege and argues that Istrian possessions were not on the same consti-
tutional level as Friulian ones within the jurisdictional framework of this ecclesiastical principality. 
The article concludes with a critical edition of the charter and its translation into modern English.
Keywords: fairs, regional trade, Bertrand de Saint-Geniès, Istria, the Patriarchate of Aquileia, Late 
Middle Ages, fourteenth century 
Ključne riječi: sajmovi, regionalno trgovanje, Bertrand de Saint-Geniès, Istra, Akvilejski patri-
jarhat, kasni srednji vijek, 14. stoljeće
On the tenth of June, 1336, Aquileian patriarch Bertrand de Saint-Geniès—both the 
spiritual head of the province and the secular ruler of his ecclesiastical principality, the 
Patriarchate of Aquileia—issued a formal charter to his loyal subjects, the people and the 
commune of Buzet (Ital. Pinguente).1 This small walled hilltop town in inland Istria was 
1 The boundaries between the patriarchs’ ecclesiastical and temporal jurisdictions did not completely overlap. The eccle-
siastical province of Aquileia included both the vast diocese of Aquileia and the following seventeen suffragan dioceses: 
Como, Mantova, Trento, Verona, Vicenza, Padova, Treviso, Ceneda, Feltre, Belluno, Concordia (Pordenone), Trieste 
(Slov./Cro. Trst), Koper (Lat. Iustinopolis, Ital. Capodistria), Novigrad (Lat. Emona, Ital. Cittanova d’ Istria), Poreč (Ital. 
Parenzo), Pula (Ital. Pola), Pićan (Ital. Pedena). Andrea Tilatti, “La provincia di Aquileia (secoli XIII-XIV),” in storia 
della chiesa in europa: tra ordinamento politico-amministrativo e strutture ecclesiastiche, ed. Luciano Vaccaro, Brescia: 
Morcelliana, 2005, 218. The patriarchs had temporal jurisdictions over the area between the rivers Isonzo and Livenza 
(Friuli) and the Margraviate of Istria. However, there were enclaves where they lost their sovereignty to other regional 
powers, most notably to Venice (the western coast of Istria from Koper to Pula) and the counts of Gorizia (the County 
of Gorizia and the County of Pazin in central Istria). For a detailed overview of the jurisdictional map of the Patriarchate 
of Aquileia in the second half of the 14th century see Pio Paschini, storia del Friuli, 3d ed., Udine: Arti grafiche friulane, 
1975, 679–97 (hereafter: sdF). Note on place names: all Istrian and some Friulian toponyms have two names, one Italian 
and the other Slovenian and/or Croatian. In order to avoid repetition of both versions of a place name, a toponym will 
regularly be given in the language of the modern nation state that the respective place belongs to in the present day. The 
first mention of any toponym with two official names will always feature both names.
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granted an official privilege to hold yearly fairs on the feast day of Saint John the Baptist 
(24th of June) and the two subsequent days. Everyone would be free to attend and trade 
during this lawful event, except for public bandits, while the entire fair would be placed un-
der the protection of the designated patriarchal official, the Margrave of Istria. The income 
from all the tolls, however, was to be equally split between the commune of Buzet and the 
Patriarchate of Aquileia.2 
This relatively unknown charter has received little attention from historians. The docu-
ment, preserved in the original and currently stored in the Croatian State Archive in Pazin, 
was published in 1994 by Jakov Jelinčić in a non-indexed provincial journal.3 Moreover, 
since the only publication of the privilege appears in an article written in Croatian, a lan-
guage not particularly accessible to non-domestic scholars, the charter remains virtually 
hidden from international scholarship. The document is therefore completely unknown to 
scholars dealing with the history of Friuli, the central temporal possession of the Aquileian 
prelates, or the medieval Patriarchate of Aquileia as a whole.4 Even the most voluminous 
monograph dedicated to Bertrand de Saint-Geniès, a detailed account of the life and career 
of this eminent ecclesiastic penned by Giordano Brunettin in over nine hundred pages, 
never mentions this document.5 The situation is not much better in Istrian scholarship; 
Jelinčić provided only a short introduction to the edition of the privilege and the charter 
has not yet been analyzed outside the exceptionally narrow context of local history.6
The present study will therefore broaden the analytical framework and analyze the four-
teenth-century Buzet privilege in the broader context of Bertrand’s policies towards urban 
centers of the Aquileian patriarchate. Following a brief overview of the complex political 
situation in the ecclesiastical principality and Bertrand’s governmental strategies, it will 
compare the charter to similar documents issued by the prince-patriarch in order to un-
cover whether the Istrian privilege stems from a carefully thought out policy carried out 
either throughout the Patriarchate or only in the Margraviate of Istria. In that way, the 
institution of Buzet’s fair will be contextualized within Bertrand’s overall political program. 
Moreover, the potential differences between the policies employed in Istria and those car-
2 See Appendix 1.
3 Jakov Jelinčić, “Dvije isprave iz 1336. godine” [Two charter from the year 1336], Buzetski zbornik [Buzet miscellanea] 
(hereafter: BZ), 19, 1994, 27–33. The document is written in Gothic miniscule on a piece of parchment 400 millimeters 
wide and 310 millimeters long, it is preserved in original and can currently be found in the Croatian State Archive in 
Pazin (Ital. Pisino) under the signature HR-DAPA 797-15 in the collection “Zbirka isprava” (Collection of charters). The 
high-resolution image of the document is available online on the monasterium.net web pages. <http://monasterium.net/
mom/HR-DAPA/797/797-15/charter> [last accessed: 24th of May, 2018].
4 Besides Paschini’s classic cited in fn. 1, see also Pier Silverio Leicht, Breve storia del Friuli, 5th ed., Udine: Libreria Editrice 
Aquileia, 1976; Gian Carlo Menis, storia del Friuli: Dalle origini alla caduta dello stato patriarcale (1420) con cenni fino 
al 20. secolo, 10th ed., Udine: Società filologica friulana, 2002; Donata Degrassi, “L’economia del tardo medioevo,” in 
storia della società friulana: il medioevo, ed. Paolo Cammarosano, Tavagnacco: Casamassima, 1988, 269–435; Giordano 
Brunettin, “L’evoluzione impossibile. Il principato ecclesiastico di Aquileia tra retaggio feudale e tentazioni signorili 
(1251-1350),” in il patriarcato di Aquileia. Uno stato nell’europa medievale, ed. Paolo Cammarosano, Udine: Casamas-
sima, 1999, 67–226. 
5 Giordano Brunettin, Bertrando di saint-Geniès patriarca di Aquileia (1334-1350), Spoleto: Fondazione Italiano di Studi 
sull’Alto Medioevo, 2004.
6 I use the terms Friulian and Istrian historiography without references to any national components. Thus, both Friulian 
and Istrian historiography designates a body of scholarship dedicated to the histories of these historical regions penned 
by authors of whatsoever nationalities in whatsoever languages.
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ried out in Friuli will demonstrate the putative special position of the Istrian margraviate 
within the temporal state of the Aquileian prelates—a position often dubbed “the appen-
dix” to the Patriarchate in order to highlight the peripheral role of Istrian possessions in 
comparison to Friuli, only the latter being the constitutive element of the ecclesiastical 
principality.7 Finally, wanting to popularize the charter and make it accessible to both pro-
fessional scholars as well as students and the interested non-specialists, the paper provides 
a new transcription of the privilege along with its translation into modern English in the 
appendix. 
Bertrand de Saint-Geniès was instituted the patriarch of Aquileia in particularly tumul-
tuous times for the ecclesiastical principality. An educated noble from Quercy region in 
southwestern France, doctor utriusque iuris from the university of Toulouse, Bertrand en-
joyed a distinguished position in the papal curia following the election of his close associate 
and patron, Jacques Duèse, as Pope John XXII in 1316.8 After several diplomatic missions 
in both France and Italy as a papal nuncius, Bertrand was nominated the patriarch of Aq-
uileia by the pope on the fourth of July, 1334.9 The choice of Bertrand, an accomplished 
diplomat and a learned university professor with years of experience, was not coincidental; 
the pope needed a skilled and reliable leader at the head of a precarious ecclesiastical prin-
cipality torn apart by numerous factional strives.10 Bertrand inherited a dominion in tur-
moil: the central government had not been functioning since the death of his predecessor, 
Pagano della Torre († 19th of December, 1332); the western border was being threatened by 
the expansionism of a powerful noble family clan, the Da Caminos; and the de facto power 
had been placed in the hands of the counts of Gorizia (Slov./Cro. Gorica, Germ. Görz), the 
hereditary advocates of the Aquileian Church and traditionally bellicose ghibellines led 
by Beatrice, the widow of Henry II of Gorizia, daughter of Gherardo III da Camino, and 
7 This argument was famously put forth by Giovanni de Vergottini, a remarkably gifted Istrian medievalist, back in 1926. 
The argument is based on the fact that no representative of Istrian communities sat in the Friulian Parliament, the central 
deliberative assembly of the Patriarchate, and that the official law code of the principality, constitutiones Patrie Foriiulii, 
did not pertain to the Margraviate of Istria. Giovanni de Vergottini, “La costituzione provinciale dell’Istria nel tardo 
Medio Evo” (hereafter: La costituzione I), Atti e memorie della società istriana di archeologia e storia patria (hereafter: 
Amsi), 38, no. 2, 1926, 117.
8 The literature on this distinguished diplomat and ecclesiastic is considerable. Besides the already cited Brunettin’s mono-
graph, see also P. Paschini, sdF, 463–96; Andrea Tilatti, “Principe, vescovo, martire e patrono: Il beato Bertrando di 
Saint-Geniès patriarca d’Aquileia (+1350),” rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa, 27, 1991, 413–44; Andrea Tilatti, “Ber-
trand de Saint-Geniès,” ce fastu? rivista della società filologica friulana, 75, 1999, 37–50; Andrea Tilatti, “Saint-Geniès 
(di) Bertrando,” ed. Cesare Scalon, nuovo Liruti: Dizionario Biografico dei Friulani, vol. 1: il medioevo, Udine: Forum, 
2006, <http://www.dizionariobiograficodeifriulani.it/saint-genies-di-bertrando/> [last accessed: 24th of May, 2018]; An-
drea Tilatti, “Saint-Geniès, Bertrand de,” Dizionario Biografico degli italiani, Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 
2017, <http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/bertrand-de-saint-genies_(Dizionario-Biografico)/> [last accessed: 24th of 
May, 2018].
9 On the office of papal nuncius, see Kriston R. Rennie, The Foundations of medieval Papal Legation, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013, 67–72. Bertrand’s letter of appointment is edited in Guillaume Mollat, ed., Jean XXii (1316-1334): 
Lettres communes analysées d’Après les registres dits d’Avignon et du Vatican, vol. 13, Paris: E. De Doccard, 1933, doc. no. 
63481. On Bertrand’s appointment as the patriarch of Aquileia see A. Tilatti, “Bertrand de Saint-Geniès,” 40–41; G. Bru-
nettin, Bertrando di saint-Geniès, 185. Pio Paschini dates the appointment to the 8th of July, but this is the date of papal 
permissions that followed after the official appointment. P. Paschini, sdF, 463–464. The papal bull from the 8th of July 
1335 is edited in Bernardo Maria De Rubeis, monumenta ecclesiae Aquileiensis, Venice, 1757, cols. 867–868 (hereafter: 
meA).
10 G. Brunettin, Bertrando di saint-Geniès, 181–84; A. Tilatti, “Bertrand de Saint-Geniès,” 42–43.
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regent in place of her minor son John Henry.11 Moreover, the Margraviate of Istria, a de iure 
Aquileian possession since 1209, was in even greater danger: the County of Pula, the rich-
est part of the already dwindled Margraviate, pledged fealty to Venice in the same manner 
as the majority of other Istrian coastal cities had done back in the 13th century.12
Despite the particularly difficult position Bertrand found himself in following his official 
takeover of the Patriarchate, the newly consecrated prelate would not be unnerved. Cou-
rageously and energetically, the prince-patriarch proceeded to create order out of chaos, 
reaffirm the jurisdictions of his Church and deal with the enemies threatening the very 
existence of his principality. Bertrand forged strategic alliances with two powerful Euro-
pean dynasts: Charles Robert, King of Hungary, and Otto and Albert II Habsburg, Dukes 
of Austria.13 The treaties were essential in order to secure the principality’s eastern fron-
tier. Namely, following the death in 1335 of Henry of Gorizia, Duke of Carinthia, without 
male heirs, Carinthia was officially given to the Habsburgs that thus became new powerful 
neighbors on the Patriarchate’s eastland.14 Bertrand, seeking to establish amicable relations 
with the Austrian dukes, promised free passage to the Habsburg’s subjects throughout the 
lands under his jurisdiction, but in turn asked for help in revendicating Lož (Germ. Laas) 
from the counts of Ortenburg.15 The alliance with the Hungarian crown was in essence a 
safety valve in case of any hostilities between the Austrian dukes and the Aquileian Church. 
In that way, the patriarch gained powerful allies capable of maintaining the balance of pow-
er in the region and keeping the potential enemies of the Patriarchate at bay, while simul-
taneously managing to regain a strategically important possession with the castle of Lož.16
As the alliances to secure the eastern borders were being made, Bertrand proceeded to 
deal with the Da Caminos’ expansionism in western Friuli and the Venetian occupation 
of the County of Pula. Rizzardo III, called Novello, was thus officially refused investiture 
over Cadore, Cordignano, Reginzolo and Cavolano, a bold move that could be read as a 
declaration of war.17 Simultaneously with this proclamation of hostility, the patriarch went 
11 P. Paschini, sdF, 460–462; G. Brunettin, “L’evoluzione impossibile,” 172–174.
12  Antonio Stefano Minotto, ed., Documenta ad Forumiulii Patriarchatum Aquileiensem, tergestum, istriam, Goritiam pect-
antia, vol. 1, Venice: Giovanni Cecchini, 1870, 109–111. For a general overview of the situation in Istria see Giovanni de 
Vergottini, Lineamenti storici della costituzione politica dell’istria durante il medio evo, Trieste: Società istriana di archeo-
logia e storia patria, 1974, 111–27 (for the period of first Venetian expansion) and 129–155 (for the period between 1291 
and 1335, including the situation in the County of Pula that led to the 1331 dedication to Venice).
13 The alliance with Charles Robert, King of Hungary, is only mentioned in a 1361 letter of instructions that the Aquileian 
patriarch Ludwig (Lodovico) della Torre sent to the ambassadors to Hungarian court. The letter is edited in Josef von 
Zahn, ed., Austro-Friulana: sammlung von Actenstücken zur Geschichte des conflictes Herzog rudolfs iV. von Österreich 
mit dem Patriarchate von Aquileja, 1358-1365. mit einschluss der vorbereitenden Documente von 1250 an., Fontes rerum 
austriacorum II. Diplomataria et Acta 40, Vienna: Karl Gerold’s Sohn, 1877, doc. no. 130. The treaty with the Austrian 
dukes is edited in ibid., doc. no. 31. See also P. Paschini, sdF, 469; G. Brunettin, Bertrando di saint-Geniès, 280–281; G. 
Brunettin, “L’evoluzione impossibile,” 187.
14 Wolfgang Eggert, ed., Dokumente zur Geschichte des Deutschen reiches und seiner Verfassung, 1331-1335, vol. 3, Monu-
menta Germaniae historica, Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum, 6,2, Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhan-
dlung, 2003, doc. no. 667.
15 “Dicti domini duces nos et ecclesiam nostram Aquilegensem tamquam defensores ipsius iuvare debeant ad recuperan-
dum omnes possessiones, bona et iura ecclesie eiusdem in terris et districtibus eorumdem, et specialiter castrum de Los 
quod nunc detinet comes Hermannus de Ortemburch.” J. von Zahn, Austro-Friulana, doc. no. 31.
16 Biblioteca civica “Vincenzo Joppi” di Udine, Fondo principale, ms. 899, Giuseppe Bianchi, ed., Documenti per la storia 
del Friuli, doc. no. 2397 (hereafter: Documenti); P. Paschini, sdF, 469.
17 Gainbattista Verci, storia della marca trevigiana e veronese, vol. 11, Venice: Giacomo Sorti, 1789, doc. no. 1271.
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to war in Istria, determined to regain the territories lost during the reign of his predecessor: 
Bale (Ital. Valle), Vodnjan (Ital. Dignano) and the County of Pula. These communities were 
caught up in the wars between the counts of Gorizia and the Castropola family, the signori 
of the County of Pula, following the premature death of Henry II of Gorizia that left a 
power vacuum in the region.18 Similarly to western Istrian communes such as Poreč, Umag 
(Ital. Umago), Rovinj (Ital. Rovigno) and Novigrad, the citizens of Pula turned to Venice, 
the only stable power in the region capable of offering protection against the destructive 
factional warfare plaguing the peninsula. Venice was happy to oblige and on the 28 of May 
1331, the dedication of Pula was officially confirmed.19 However, the treaty was not ratified 
by the Aquileian patriarch, who was still a de iure lord of the Istrian margraviate, including 
the County of Pula.20
Bertrand was obviously not ready to abandon his possessions in Istria as he mounted an 
offensive against Venetian forces on the peninsula. Unfortunately for the patriarch, as the 
war raged on one battlefield against a dangerous and well-provisioned enemy such as the 
serenissima, Rizzardo III da Camino attacked the western borders of the principality ren-
dering Bertrand’s forces split between the two fronts.21 It was at this moment that Bertrand 
gave up on the revendication of the County of Pula and came to terms with Venice in order 
to focus his forces against Rizzardo Novello. The final treaty, by which the patriarch for-
mally renounced his rights over Bale, Vodnjan and the entire County of Pula in exchange 
for an annual payment of 225 silver marks, was officially signed on 15 July 1335.22 In that 
way, the Margraviate of Istria shrank to a mere reliquia reliquiarum, counting no more than 
one coastal commune in the very north-west of the peninsula: Muggia (Slov./Croat. Milje); 
seven small castra, semi-urban walled hilltop settlements: Buje (Ital. Buie), Oprtalj (Ital. 
Portole), Buzet, Grožnjan (Ital. Grisignana), Dvigrad (Ital. Due Castelli), Labin (Ital. Al-
bona) and Plomin (Ital. Fianona); along with two modest forts: Kaštel (Ital. Castelvenere) 
and Petrapilosa (Ital. Pietrapelosa).
The patriarch was more successful in his wars against the Da Caminos. The Aquileian 
army managed to best Rizzardo’s forces in the Battle of Camolli (near Sacile).23 Soon after 
Rizzardo III Novello died without male heirs, allowing Bertrand to regain all the posses-
sions the Da Caminos held in fief from the Aquileian patriarchate.24 With the disputable 
lands officially revendicated, the war ended as a great triumph for the resolute head of the 
Aquileian Church.
18 Camillo de Franceschi, “Il comune polese e la signoria di Castropola,” Amsi, 19, 1903, 169–189 (hereafer: Il comune 
polese III).
19 A. S. Minotto, Documenta, vol. 1, 109–111; C. de Franceschi, “Il comune polese III,” 189–192.
20 The first treaty between Venice and the Patriarchate of Aquileia regarding the Venetian jurisdiction over the coastal 
communes was signed in 1300 and officially ratified by the pope in 1307. According to this treaty, Venice was to pay 
an annual tribute of 450 silver marks to the Patriarchate for the jurisdiction over Koper, Piran (Ital. Pirano), Izola (Ital. 
Isola), Umag, Motovun (Ital. Montona), Poreč, Sv. Lovreč Pazenatički (Ital. San Lorenzo del Pasenatico) and Rovinj. A. 
S. Minotto, Documenta, vol. 1, 49–50; Pietro Kandler, ed., codice diplomatico istriano, vol. 3, 2nd ed., Trieste: Tipografia 
Riva, 1986, doc. no. 523 (hereafter: cDi). 
21 Guglielmo Cortusi and Albrighetto Cortusi, chronica de novitatibus Padue et Lombardie, ed. Beniamino Pagnin, Rerum 
Italicarum scriptores, serie II, 12.5, Bologna: Zanichelli, 1975, 69.
22 Camillo de Franceschi, “Il comune polese e la signoria di Castropola,” Amsi 20, no. 3–4, 1905, doc. no. 29.
23 G. Cortusi and A. Cortusi, chronica de novitatibus Padue, 69–70; G. Brunettin, “L’evoluzione impossibile,” 188.
24 G. Bianchi, Documenti, doc. no. 2437.
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Emboldened by his new alliances and the victory over Rizzardo Novello, the patriarch 
continued with the policy of strengthening his jurisdictions by setting his eyes upon Ven-
zone (Slov. Pušja vas) in Friuli, a town in the potestas of the counts of Gorizia. This strategic 
castrum had been held by the late Henry of Carinthia and following his death without 
male heirs, the town was to revert to the Patriarchate of Aquileia.25 However, the counts 
of Gorizia had bought Venzone from Henry prior to his death and thus had no intentions 
of relinquishing it.26 As the advocates would not surrender the possession they considered 
rightfully theirs, war broke out in the summer of 1336 and Bertrand’s forces were again 
victorious; the patriarch managed to best the enemy army in the Battle of Braulins.27 The 
first war against the traditional enemies of the Aquileian prelates and their most danger-
ous adversaries ended triumphantly; Venzone signed its pacts of surrender and formally 
opened the gates to the prince-patriarch.28
The patriarch’s international esteem rose even further the following spring when he 
hosted a powerful European heir to the throne, Charles IV of Luxembourg, the margrave 
of Moravia, the future king of Romans (1346) and the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire 
(1355), along with Bartholomew, the count of Senj and Krk (Ital. Segna and Veglia).29 A vic-
torious military leader, distinguished diplomat and reputable statesman protected by pow-
erful allies, Bertrand de Saint-Geniès even made the counts of Gorizia bend their knees to 
their rightful seigneur. Albert III of Gorizia asked Bertrand for the official investiture of all 
the lands his family held from the Aquileian Church in Friuli and on the 25th of February 
the patriarch ceremonially invested his vassal with a ring and a standard.30 Moreover, on 
the 21st of June, 1339, count Albert III of Gorizia signed a treaty of mutual aid with the 
patriarch, obliging both to a military alliance in Friuli, Karst (Ital. Carso, Slov./Cro. Kras) 
and Istria.31 This era of peace, unfortunately, was not to last.
Allied with the counts of Krk, the Aquileian advocates mounted an offensive against the 
counts of Duino (Slov./Cro. Devin) and patriarch Bertrand in Friuli.32 The war that ensued 
25 Henry inherited Venzone from his father, Maynard IV, who received it from the patriarch Raymond (Raimondo) della 
Torre in 1288. Giuseppe Bianchi, ed., Documenta historiae forojuliensis saeculi Xiii: Ab anno 1200 ad 1299. summatim 
regesta, Vienna: Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1861, doc. no. 544.
26 G. Bianchi, Documenti, doc. no. 2362; B. De Rubeis, meA, col. 849; G. Brunettin, “L’evoluzione impossibile,” 191; Peter 
Štih, i conti di Gorizia e l’istria nel medioevo, Collana degli Atti 36, Rovinj: Centro di ricerche storiche Rovigno, 2013, 
157.
27 Braulins, the fort protecting Venzone, was conquered on the 27th of August, 1336. G. Bianchi, Documenti, doc. no. 2497; 
Vincenzo Joppi, “Documenti goriziani del secolo XIV,” Archeografo triestino (hereafter: At), ser. 2, 14, no. 1, 1888, doc. 
no. 128 (hereafter: DG 6).
28 The pacts were officially ratified by the Friulian Parliament on the 24th of November, 1336. J. von Zahn, Austro-Friulana, 
doc. no. 32. The entire first war with the counts of Gorizia is described in details in G. Brunettin, Bertrando di saint-
Geniès, 302–314.
29 The duo arrived in the Patriarchate on a small fishing boat as they fled from Venetian forces. Josef Emler, ed., “Vita Caroli 
IV,” in Fontes rerum Bohemicarum, vol. 3, Prague: Nadání Františka Palackého, 1882, 352–353.
30 Vincenzo Joppi, “Documenti goriziani del secolo XIV,” At, ser. 2, 14, no. 2, 1888, doc. no. 147 (hereafter: DG 7).
31 V. Joppi, DG 7, doc. no. 149.
32 The counts of Duino were traditionally faithful vassals of the house of Gorizia. They were incarcerated following the 
Battle of Braulins and subsequently pledged fealty to Bertrand, promising to support the patriarch against any enemy of 
the Aquileian Church (including the Aquileian advocates). G. Bianchi, Documenti, doc. no. 2673. This alliance between 
the counts of Duino and Bertrand was seen as a grave offence by the counts of Gorizia who thus attacked their unfaithful 
ministerials and started the second war against patriarch Bertrand. On the counts of Duino see P. Štih, i conti di Gorizia, 
142–159, esp. 157–158.
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played out as a traditional Aquileian conflict between the patriarchs and their advocates. 
Waged with periodic ceasefires and sieges, the conflict ended with a treaty signed on the 
26th of May, 1343, obliging both parties to a five-year truce.33 However, as Bertrand narrates 
in his letters to Venetian authorities, numerous small-scale conflicts continued throughout 
the Patriarchate while he ruled “with an iron fist”.34 Following the end of the official period 
of peace, armed conflict between Bertrand and the counts of Gorizia resumed, engulfing 
the entire ecclesiastical principality in a destructive blaze of warfare. After numerous mili-
tary campaigns, skirmishes and sieges, Bertrand de Saint-Geniès, the prince-patriarch who 
at one point celebrated a Christmas mass clad in full armor while maintaining a siege of 
Gorizia, lost his life; the energetic prelate was “cruelly murdered by the people of the counts 
of Gorizia” at Richinvelda on the 6th of June, 1350 (prope ecclesiam richinvelt per gentes do-
mini comitis Goritie,... curdeliter interfectus fuit olim pie memorie patriarcha Beltrandus).35 
Following yet another crisis of factional feuding that ravaged Friuli, Bertrand’s successor, 
Nicholas (Nicolò) of Luxembourg started a canonization process for the late patriarch as 
news of miracles performed next to his resting place in Udine (Slov. Videm) began circulat-
ing.36 Although never sainted by the Catholic Church, the patriarch was officially beatified 
and the cult of Blessed Bertrand de Saint-Geniès was formally recognized by the Holy See 
in 1599.37
During his vigorous reign, more specifically in the tumultuous period between Bertrand’s 
first military campaigns and the five-year peace treaty with the counts of Gorizia (i.e. be-
tween 1335 and 1342), the prince-patriarch issued no less than seven market privileges to 
various urban centers throughout the Patriarchate of Aquileia. The annual fair in Buzet 
was privileged first (10th of June, 1336) and it was followed by the privileging of weekly 
market in Venzone (21st of September, 1336),38 the fairs of Cividale (Slov./Cro. Čedad) (5th 
of June 1337),39 the weekly markets of San Vito al Tagliamento (14th of February 1341),40 
33 G. Joppi, DG 7, doc. no. 167. For a detailed account of the second war with the counts of Gorizia see G. Brunettin, Ber-
trando di saint-Geniès, 477–487.
34 V. Joppi, DG 7, doc. no. 174; J. von Zahn, Austro-Friulana, doc. no. 41 (where Bertrand himself states that “licet alios 
regamus in virga ferrea”).
35 Iohannes de Victring, Liber certarum historiarum, ed. Fedor Schneider, vol. 2, Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scrip-
tores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum separatim editi 36, Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1910, 220. See 
also for this period Pier Silverio Leicht, “La rivolta feudale contro il patriarca Bertrando,” memorie storiche forogiuliesi 
(hereafter: msF), 41, 1954-1955, 1–94; G. Brunettin, Bertrando di saint-Geniès, 737–800. For Bertrand’s death see A. 
Tilatti, “Principe, vescovo, martire e patrono,” 413–417 (the quotation in the text on 413).
36 “Miracula legitime ac iuridice deposita anno MCCCLII, Iunio, Iulio, et initio Augusti,” in Acta sanctorum iunii (hereafter 
AA.ss iunii), Godefridus Henschenius et al., eds., vol. 1, Antwerpen: Henricus Thieullier, 1695, 779–802. See also Tilatti, 
“Principe, vescovo, martire e patrono,” 423–442; Andrea Tilatti, “Tra santità e oblio: storie di vescovi uccisi in Italia nor-
dorientale (secoli XIII-XIV),” in L’évêque, l’image et la mort. identité et mémoire au moyen Âge, ed. Nicholas Bock, Ivan 
Foletti, and Michele Tomasi, Rome: Viella, 2014, 614–619.
37 “Decretum de cultu publico premisso per Clementem VIII,” in AA.ss iunii, vol. 1, 779. See also Andrea Tilatti, “Riscrit-
ture agiografiche: Santi medioevali nella cultura friulana dei secoli XVII e XVIII,” in Finzione e santità tra medioevo ed 
età moderna, ed. Gabriella Zarri, Turin: Rosenberg & Sellier, 1991, 280–305. The feast day is the sixth of June, the day of 
Bertrand’s murder.
38 G. Bianchi, Documenti, doc. no. 2505.
39 Ibid., doc. no. 2623. This privilege was reissued and elaborated in more detail on the 23d of June, 1339. It specified, 
among other, that the gastald of Cividale along with his jurymen (cum concilium bonorum hominum) is to administer 
justice and oversee the event. Ibid., doc. no. 2837.
40 Ibid., doc. no. 2950.
Josip Banić Pro honore, utilitate et commodo: The Margraviate of Istria and the Market Privileges of the Aquileian Patriarch...
88
San Daniele (17th of February 1341)41 and Lož (Germ. Laas) (21st of February)42 with the 
institution of the annual fair in Pontebba (Slov. Tablja) (10th of August, 1342)43 ending the 
series of Bertrand’s market privileges. It is thus clear that Buzet’s charter was not unique, 
but an expression of a calculated policy aimed at bolstering regional trading throughout 
the ecclesiastical principality and investing local marketplaces with the official support of 
the central government. This policy, as shall be demonstrated, had several mutually com-
plementary goals.
Bertrand inherited the Patriarchate in a particularly severe financial crisis; the debt to-
wards the Holy See alone amounted to twenty thousand gold florins.44 Moreover, the patri-
arch’s many military campaigns over the course of his reign incurred considerable expens-
es. The prince-patriarch’s financial troubles are revealingly described by Bertrand himself 
in a famous letter he addressed to Wilhelm (Guglielmo) Mairano, the dean of Aquileia, 
in the final years of his life (ca. 1349).45 The entire letter reads as a kind of justification for 
numerous expenses incurred throughout the patriarch’s challenging reign. For instance, 
Bertrand narrates that the daily costs during the second war against the Counts of Gorizia 
exceeded five hundred florins while the first phase of the third war with the advocates cost 
the Patriarchate fifteen thousand florins.46 Additionally, numerous possessions over the en-
tire ecclesiastical principality had to be bought off from their lords. For example, Sacile was 
purchased from the countess Beatrice of Gorizia for four hundred marks.47 From this point 
of view, it becomes clear that Bertrand’s numerous market privileges were issued with a 
very practical economic goal: promoting the flow of trade and, consequently, the increase 
in money circulation.
Fairs were a particularly felicitous choice for the implementation of this policy. As an 
economic institution, fairs considerably lowered transaction costs—a term that encom-
41 Ibid., doc. no. 2951.
42 Ibid., doc. no. 2957. The same document is also edited in V. Joppi, DG 7, doc. no. 158.
43 G. Bianchi, Documenti, doc. no. 3098. Pio Paschini mentions another privilege to Pontebba that Bertrand supposedly 
issued in 1339 and thus instituted a weekly market. Unfortunately, no source is cited to back this claim. P. Paschini, 
sdF, 483. The supposed 1339 privilege to Pontebba is found neither in Bianchi’s manuscript nor any other collection of 
sources pertaining to Bertrand’s reign. Moreover, the putative 1339 privilege to Pontebba is not mentioned anywhere by 
Brunettin.
44 The debt is analyzed in more detail in Pio Paschini, “Bertrandiana” msF, 30, 1934, 226–233.
45 The letter is only preserved in a fifteenth-century copy currently stored in the Archivio capitolare in Udine, ms. 32. The 
document is edited in AA.ss. iunii, vol. 1, 783–84 as well as in Emanuela Tabiadon, “Il patriarca Bertrando di Saint-
Geniès: Vicende storiche e documenti,” in intorno al patriarca Bertrando, ed. Maria Beatrice Bertone, Udine: Forum, 
2010, 20–23. Both editions are similar, albeit not identical, and feature unnecessary interventions to the original text 
(such as the additions of -ae suffixes instead of the -e as stands in the document, typical for medieval Latin), irregular 
capitalization and unconventional punctuation. Moreover, the latter edition has several errors in transcription (such as 
“evitata” instead of “enim”, “expendebamur” instead of “expendebamus”, etc.). Luckily, the latter edition also features an 
image of the source which I have used for all the quotations from the letter that follow in this paper. 
46 Regarding the second war: “In qua guerra inexhaustam consumpsimus pecuniam. Non enim fuit dies aliqua, in qua non 
expenderemus quingentos florenos auri et ultra. Nam solum in blado equorum expendebamus singulis diebus marchas 
quadriginta <et aliquando sexaginta>, et omnibus stipendiariis integre fuit satisfactum, et ultra stipendia eorum a nobis 
alcriter cum muneribus recesserunt.” Regarding the third war: “Post anni revolutionem iterato comitis Goritie nos et 
Ecclesiam inveserunt de guerra, in qua tenuimus pro maiori parte duos exercitus, unum apud Latisanam, et alium in 
campis iuxta Manzanum ad resistentiam inimicorum, et tribus mensibus, quibus ipsa guerra duravit, habuimus trecen-
tos equites armigeros, exceptis peditibus ad nostrum stipendium. Constitit enim nobis illa guerra guindecim millibus 
florenom, et tamen per Dei gratiam in omnibus pertransivimus cum honore.”
47 “Nos enim, sicut scis, recuperavimus et redemimus terram Sacili de manibus committisse pro quadringentis marchis.”
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passes all “the costs of locating and attracting potential trading partners and of presale in-
spection”, “contracting and fulfillment costs” and “policing and enforcement costs”—while 
at the same time incurring very little upkeep and setup expenses.48 For medieval rulers, 
the institution of fairs was an inexpensive way of boosting economy through trade while at 
the same time (re)affirming their regalian rights over the privileged territories. However, 
in order for fairs to fulfill their economic functions and act as “institutional reductions to 
transaction costs”, they had to be efficient economic institutions.49 In other words, medieval 
fairs could not simply be willed into existence by the central government; they had to be 
planted on fertile economic soil. Thus, the safest fair privileges would be those issued to the 
already existing and functioning commercial events. In that way, the formal fair privileges 
“were to trade what marriage is to sex, an ex post legitimation of a phenomenon that had 
arisen under very different economic circumstances.”50 Bertrand’s policies reflected this at-
titude to a degree; the fairs of Cividale were already functioning before they were privileged 
and relocated to a newly built location.51 It remains unknown whether a commercial event 
had already been in existence in Buzet on the feast day of Saint John before the official 
privilege was issued. Judging by the text of the privilege alone, it would seem that the fair 
was a newly instituted one. If that was the case, then another question arises regarding the 
institutional efficiency of Buzet’s newly privileged fair: did it efficiently reduce transaction 
costs? According to Epstein, “the most effective test of institutional efficiency is institution-
al survival. Since a fair had to meet both set-up and permanent running costs, commercial 
failure spelled disappearance.”52 Indeed, the fair in Buzet survived for centuries, well into 
48 The literature on medieval fairs is considerable and the following is only a selection of titles that also deal with smaller, 
regional fairs, comparable to those in Friuli and Istria: Giuseppe Mira, Le fiere lombarde nei secoli XiV-XVi: Prime inda-
gini, Como: Centro Lariano per gli Studi Economici, 1955; Stephan R. Epstein, “Regional Fairs, Institutional Innovation, 
and Economic Growth in Late Medieval Europe,” economic History review, 47, no. 3, 1994, 459–482; Stephan R. Epstein, 
Freedom and Growth: The rise of states and markets in europe, 1300-1750, London: Routledge, 2000; Stephan R. Ep-
stein, “Fairs, Towns and States in Renaissance Europe,” in Fiere e mercati nella integrazione delle economie europee, secc. 
Xiii-XViii, ed. Simonetta Cavaciocchi, Istituto internazionale di storia economica “F. Datini” Prato, Serie 2: Atti delle 
“Settimane di Studi” e altri Convegni 32, Florence: Le Monnier, 2001, 71–90; Paola Lanaro, “Introduzione,” in La pratica 
dello scambio: sistemi di fiere, mercanti e città in europa (1400-1700), Venice: Marsilio, 2003, 9–17; Alberto Grohmann, 
“Fairs as Sites of Economic and Cultural Exchange,” in cultural exchange in early modern europe, ed. Donatella Calabi 
and Stephen Turk Christensen, vol. 2: cities and cultural exchange in europe, 1400–1700, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2007, 207–226; Alberto Grohmann, Fiere e mercati nell’europa occidentale, Milan: Bruno Mondadori, 2011; 
Sabine Florence Fabijanec, “Od sajma do sajma: pomorski obalni promet u ritmu svetaca zaštitnika na Jadranu” [From 
fair to fair: Maritime coastal trade and the rhythm of patron saints’ festivities on the Adriatic at the end of the Middle 
Ages], croatica christiana Periodica, 38, no. 74, 2014, 23–40. The definition of transaction costs is taken from Matthias 
Klaes, “Transaction Costs, History Of,” ed. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, The new Palgrave Dictionary of 
economics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. See also Jessica Dijkman, shapping medieval markets: The organization 
of commoditiy markets in Holland, c. 1200 - c. 1450, Leiden: Brill, 2011, 17–18.
49 S. Epstein, “Fairs,” 73. 
50 S. Epstein, “Regional Fairs,” 469.
51 “Reverendus in Christo pater et dominus, dominus Bertrandus, Dei et Apostolice Sedis gratia sancte sedis Aquilegensis 
patriarcha, volens commodo terre Civitatis Austrie et utilitati publice providere pro bono captando et damno vetando, 
ordinavit provisoribus et Consilio Civitatis ibidem, nomine sue et Communis Civitatis congregatis pro nundinis sive 
mercato Sancte Marie de Monte, sive de mense Septembris, et Sancti Martini, fiat de cetero in Burgo Pontis Civitatis et in 
campo Astilodii, et in territoriis que emerunt ad ampliandum dictum campum, quarum quelibet nundinarum duret per 
tres dies inclusive sequentes, et sint libere et franche, in quibus non petatur nec exigatur aliqua muta vel alia gabella.” G. 
Bianchi, Documenti, doc. no. 2623.
52 S. Epstein, “Fairs,” 75.
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the Venetian era (from 1421 to 1797) and it was confirmed by Venice with a special ducale 
in 1421 and 1458, as well as in 1737.53 Notarial acts from the early 16th century also testify 
to the existence of Buzet’s fair on the 24th of June.54 While it cannot be determined whether 
Bertrand privileged an already existing commercial event in Istria, it can be concluded that 
Buzet’s fair, like those of Pontebba and Cividale, was an efficient economic institution.
Another characteristic of the policy of market privileging is that new fairs often enter the 
already existing circuit of annual trading events, or at least challenge and compete with old-
er fairs.55 In Istria, a region divided into three jurisdictional enclaves, the fairs on the feast 
day of Saint John were established in both Venetian, Gorizian and Aquileian parts. Already 
in the fourteenth century, the Venetian commune of Poreč organized a fair on Saint John’s 
feast day.56 Moreover, the Gorizian town Momjan (Ital. Momiano), twenty kilometers west 
of Buzet also held its fair on the 24th of June.57 Both sources that attest to these two fairs 
date from a period after Bertrand’s privilege to Buzet: the statute of Poreč from 1363 and 
the capitulary of Momjan from 1521. Thus, it cannot be determined with a greater degree 
of certainty whether Bertrand challenged these two fairs by his 1336 privilege, or if Poreč 
and Momjan instituted their fairs as a response to Buzet’s successful commercial event. 
There was, however, another nearby regional fair held on the same feast day that predated 
Bertrand’s privilege: the fairs of San Giovanni (Slov. Štivan) by Duino.58 This fair was under 
the institutional protection of the counts of Duino, the ministerials of the counts of Gorizia 
and enemies of the patriarch during the war for Venzone. As a matter of fact, following 
the battle of Braulins that ended the first war against the Aquileian advocates, George of 
Duino was one of the prisoners incarcerated by the patriarch.59 Thus, Bertrand’s privilege to 
Buzet can be read as a specific economic sanction to the house of Duino, a punishment for 
53 Zadarka Greblo, “Izvori za povijest Istre u gradivu Rašporskog kapetanata [Sources for Istrian history in the archives of 
the Captainate of Rašpor],” BZ, 30, 2004, 188–189 for the reproduction of the source.
54 E.g. Mirko Zjačić, ed., “Notarska knjiga Martina Sotolića (Registrum imbreviaturarum Martini Sotolich notarii Pin-
quentini) 1492.-1517. godine” [Notarial register of Martin Sotolić (Registrum imbreviaturarum Martini Sotolich notarii 
Pinquentini)], monumenta historico-iuridica slavorum meridionalium, 18, 1979, 358, 372–373.
55 S. Epstein, “Fairs,” 78–79. For the circuits of fairs in late medieval Italy see e.g. Giuseppe Mira, “L’organizzazione fieristica 
nel quadro dell’economia della ‘Bassa’ lombarda alla fine del medioevo e nell’età moderna,” Archivio storico lombardo, 84, 
1958, 289–300.
56 Mirko Zjačić, ed., “Statut grada Poreča (statutum comunis Parentii) iz 1363. godine” [The statute of the city of Poreč (stat-
utum comunis Parentii) from the year 1363], monumenta historico-iuridica slavorum meridionalium, 18, 1979, 163–164.
57 Ivan Milotić, momjanski kapitular / il capitolare di momiano, Buje: Pučko otvoreno učilište Buje, 2014, 134–135. I refer 
here to the digital reproduction of the source because the transcription, provided by the author on pages 113–120, is 
absolutely horrendous. See my review of this publication in Histria 5 (2015): 198–205.
58 The fairs of San Giovanni by Duino during the feast day of Saint John the Baptist are mentioned already in a document 
from 1319. The document, a forma ambaxate, features instructions given by Hugh (Ugo) of Duino to his ambassador to 
Venice, Domnius (Doimo, Deumus in the document) of Rijeka (Ital. Fiume), regarding the ongoing feuds between the 
Venetian captain of Belforte and Hugh’s subjects of San Giovanni by Duino. The line attesting to San Giovanni’s fairs 
reads: “Item quod semper et continue consuetum est omni tempore, quod quandocumque mercatum seu ferie retinentur 
in festo Sancti Iohannis Baptiste, portum Belfortis consuevit esse apertum, et exinde omnes mercatores ire, redire, exire, 
intrire consueverunt cum mercadantiis secure sine aliquorum contradictione ad dictum forum et ferias Sancti Iohannis, 
et quod maior pars mercatorum sunt de Venetiis, quando quidem voster capitaneus Belfortis contradicit, nec eos per-
mittit, et, quod peius est, certos mercatores cum spitiaria iam cepit et misit Venetias, qui ibant ad dictum forum Sancti 
Iohannis.” Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Libri commemoriali, reg. 2, fol. 56r. The abstract of the document is published 
in Riccardo Predelli, ed., i libri commemoriali della repubblica di Venezia: regesti, vol. 1, Venice: Deputazione veneta di 
storia patria, 1876, lib. 2, doc. no. 198.
59 P. Kandler, cDi, vol. 3, doc. no. 656; P. Paschini, sdF, 470; G. Brunettin, Bertrando di saint-Geniès, 313. See also fn. 32.
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their imprudent alliance with the counts of Gorizia. These “fair wars” were further compli-
cated in the middle of the 15th century as Reinprecht of Walsee, the lord of Rijeka issued a 
privilege to his town and instituted another fair on the feast day of Saint John.60 Therefore, 
instead of a regional circuit of mutually complimentary fairs in Istria—where one fair ends 
as another begins—the jurisdictionally divided peninsula became a scene of at least four 
competing fairs on Saint John’s feast day.
Although all the fairs promoted by patriarch Bertrand should be defined as regional 
fairs—“those with neither strictly local nor purely ‘international’ functions, occurring only 
a few times a year, lasting usually more than one day, and often having toll exemptions and 
other privileges that daily and weekly markets lacked”—it is important to note that Buzet’s 
fair was not privileged in the same manner as those of Cividale and Pontebba.61 Unlike 
those two Friulian possessions, Buzet was not bestowed with a toll-free fair.62 Instead, the 
tolls were to be charged and the profits equally split between the central government and 
the subject commune. Can it thus be concluded that, in comparison to Friuli, Istrian pos-
sessions of the Aquileian Church enjoyed inferior privileges? While the patriarch abolished 
the tolls of privileged markets in Friuli—only Buzet’s charter mentions any sort of tolls to 
be collected by the central government—he also did not bestow upon any community the 
right to keep a portion of the fee either. Thus, the privilege to Buzet allowed the commune 
(and the central government) to earn extra income at the expense of higher transaction 
costs. This fact alone does little to strengthen the opinion that the Margraviate of Istria was 
“an appendix” to the ecclesiastical principality, an additional source of income rather than 
60 The privilege, issued in 1444, is edited in Attilio Hortis, “Appendice alla illustrazione dei documenti risguardanti la storia 
di Trieste e dei Walsee,” At, n.s., 5, 1877-1878, 95–97. See also S. Florence Fabijanec, “Od sajma do sajma,” 27, 30 and 37 
for additional examples of “fair wars” in the context of medieval Adriatic communes.
61 The definition of a regional fair is taken from S. Epstein, Freedom and Growth, 73. Moreover, both Friulian and Istrian 
fairs fall into the category of regional fairs as they take place “in small centers in frontier areas”, less densely urbanized 
regions where such commercial events assume “modest economic significance” (in comparison to “international” fairs). 
P. Lanaro, “Introduzione,” 11. Unfortunately, it is impossible to analyze the economic impact of Buzet’s fair due to the 
lack of sources; the first recorded transactions date from the first half of the 16th century. On medieval fairs in Friuli 
see D. Degrassi, “L’economia del tardo medioevo,” 343; Federico Seneca, “Sulle fiere udinesi di S. Caterina e S. Canciano 
alla fine del Quattrocento,” Archivio Veneto, ser. 5, 82, 1967, 15–28. Regrettably, I was not able to consult M.P. Minca’s 
diploma thesis titled “Mercati e fiere nel Friuli patriarcale,” supervised by Carlo Guido Mor and defended in 1964 at the 
University of Trieste, as the thesis was not available for consultation due to “alcuni lavori che stanno investendo una parte 
dell’archivio tesi.” Servizio Tesi, “Re: Richiesta tesi di laurea per consultazione,” message to Josip Banić, 2nd of May, 2017, 
e-mail.
62 Cf. the texts of the three privileges. Cividale’s is quoted in fn. 51, Buzet’s in appendix 1 and Pontebba’s reads: “Sancte sedis 
Aquilegensis Dei gratia nos patriarcha Bertrandus notum fore volumus universis, quod ad supplicationem dilecti filii 
fratris Giberti abbatis monasterii mosacensis nostro aquilegensis diocesis, cupientes villam suam de Ponteba et eius in-
colas paterno affectu, honoribus et commodis promovere, mercatum publicum liberum et generale annis singulis semel 
in anno, videlicet, per tres dies ante festum nativitatis Beate Marie Virginis et per tres dies post fiendum et habendum 
in dicta villa di Ponteba, prefato abbati ac eius monasterio de speciali gratia duximus concedendam, statuentes et ordi-
nantes, quod universi et singuli mercatores et alii undecumque et cuiuscumque conditionis existant, dum tamen non sint 
publici latrones aut depredatores stratarum aut banniti ecclesie Aquilegensis, venientes ad mercatum huiusmodi, salvi 
sint et securi cum omnibus bonis et rebus suis, et sub protectione nostra et ecclesie memorate in eundo, stando, et rede-
undo, non obstantibus quibuscumque represaliis alicui persone quacumque occasione aut vel quavis forma verborum 
concessis seu etiam concedendis. Volentes quoque et ordinantes, quod mercatores cum suis mercationibus ad dictam 
mercatum vendentes per terras nostras de Selusa, Venzone, Tumelto et Montefalcone, ac alia nostra loca, pro dictis 
mercationibus, quas vendent aut emerint in dicto mercato, mutam aliquam non persolvant. In cuius rei testimonium 
presentes fieri iussimus nostri sigilli appensione munitas.” G. Bianchi, Documenti, doc. no. 3098.
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a constitutive possession, but it does show a different treatment between the two regions.
Notwithstanding the unequal status of the region, Bertrand dedicated considerable en-
ergy in revendicating and protecting the rights of his Church on the peninsula: he bought 
several towns and forts from the countess Beatrice for four hundred and fifty marks;63 he 
intervened in the conflict between Oprtalj and Motovun, the former Aquileian the latter 
Venetian commune, regarding the rights over woodland resources;64 and he made sure 
that the office of the Istrian margraves is regularly rotated among the faithful nobles of the 
Aquileian patriarchate.65 Finally, it may be added that although Bertrand managed to set-
tle the inherited debt towards the Holy See, he died before he was able to pay the expenses 
incurred during his own reign. Bertrand’s debt towards the Holy See, which amounted to 
2550 golden florins, could not be paid directly from the central government’s treasury as 
the ecclesiastical principality fell into a serious crisis following the patriarch’s assassination. 
The papacy therefore decided to settle the debt by collecting the annual tribute Venice 
owed to the Patriarchate for the jurisdictions over Istrian possessions.66 Thus, it was the 
Margraviate of Istria that in the end settled Bertrand’s final debts.
Another major source of income for the central government of the Aquileian patriar-
chate were the tolls collected from the use of public roads.67 The increase in regional trading 
across the ecclesiastical principality, boosted from both the newly privileged local weekly 
markets and annual fairs, undoubtedly led to the increasing use of highways connecting 
different marketplaces across the Patriarchate. Bertrand counted on the incomes levied 
from these tolls and he spent considerable energy in reaffirming his regalian rights over all 
public roads. At the very beginning of his term, Bertrand publicly announced that all the 
highways in Friuli would remain his exclusive prerogative and not of the Aquileian advo-
cates, the counts of Gorizia.68 Consequently, the right over public roads carried the obliga-
tion to keep them secure and defend the itinerant merchants from any acts of brigandage. 
Thus, Bertrand undertook military actions against the known brigands in order to boost 
the safety of the highways and, consequently, increase the income levied from the tolls. For 
example, Gian Francesco and Federico di Castello were tried and condemned for their acts 
of brigandage in a per a(d)stantes judicial trial.69 Moreover, certain charters were issued in 
63 “Scis etiam quomodo stabant terre et castra nostra Istre et cum quanto labore nos illa habere potuimus a predicta com-
mittissa, datis sibi plus quadrigenti quinquaginta marchis.” Source cited in fn. 45.
64 P. Kandler, cDi, vol. 3, doc. no. 694; G. Brunettin, Bertrando di saint-Geniès, 597.
65 Bertrand leased the office of the Istrian margrave for a term of one year. See e.g. the investitures in P. Kandler, cDi, vol. 
3, doc. no. 685 and doc. no. 716. The patriarch was regularly rotating his officials in all the other governmental offices. 
Donata Degrassi, “Ricchezza e costi dello stato: Bertrando e l’amministrazione del Patriarcato,” in intorno al patriarca 
Bertrando, ed. Maria Beatrice Bertone, Udine: Forum, 2010, 45.
66 R. Predelli, i libri commemoriali, vol. 2, lib. 2, doc. no. 358; P. Paschini, “Bertrandiana,” 233.
67 D. Degrassi, “L’economia del tardo medioevo,” 325; D. Degrassi, “Ricchezza e costi,” 40–41.
68 V. Joppi, DG 6, doc. no. 118.
69 The a(d)stanti were a sort of a jury composed by the local notables who would voice their verdict following the ritual 
quid iuris? question posed by the presiding judge, in this case the patriarch himself. This type of justice administration 
was widespread across the entire Patriarchate of Aquileia, including the Margraviate of Istria. Pier Silverio Leicht, ed., 
Parlamento friulano, vol. 1: (1228-1420), Bologna: Zanichelli, 1927, XXIV–XXVI; P. Paschini, sdF, 362–363; Donata De-
grassi, “Mutamenti istituzionali e riforma della legislazione: il Friuli dal dominio patriarchino a quello veneziano (XIV-
XV secolo),” in continuità e cambiamenti nel Friuli tardo medievale (Xii-XV secolo): saggi di storia economica e sociale, 
Trieste: CERM, 2009, 163–167. The document here in question refers to the jury as circumstantes. G. Bianchi, Documenti, 
doc. no. 2992. See also G. Brunettin, “L’evoluzione impossibile,” 197. On the per astantes trials see also Josip Banić, “Pro-
Pro honore, utilitate et commodo: The Margraviate of Istria and the Market Privileges of the Aquileian Patriarch... Josip Banić
93
order to direct the flow of trade, and itinerant merchants, away from the Gorizian roads 
and onto the highways under the jurisdiction of the central government. For example, the 
patriarch offered safe-conduct to the merchants of Villach on the Bovec-Cividale public 
road and thus diverted them from using the Gorizian route along the River Isonzo.70 In 
that way, Bertrand’s market privileges were also aimed at boosting the principality’s income 
from public roads while simultaneously weakening the bellicose advocate’s profits. Finally, 
the motives behind the revendication of Venzone in large measure stemmed from its stra-
tegic position overlooking important highways connecting Friuli with Carinthia.71
In the Margraviate of Istria, or what was left of it by the time of Bertrand’s reign, the 
highways leading to Friuli were passing through the territories of the counts of Gorizia and 
their ministerials, most notably the counts of Duino. Therefore, Bertrand could not count 
on the profits from public roads to the same degree as he could in Friuli. This may be one 
of the main reasons behind the decision to keep the tolls for Buzet’s fair, as there would 
be little profits to be made had these been abolished. The Aquileian subjects in the Istrian 
margraviate did, however, benefit from the newly privileged fair as the margrave’s presence 
insured the safety of the roads leading from Karst to the wider Buzet area. Moreover, the 
fair was to be held exactly at the time of year when the livestock was moved to the pastures 
in the mountains, so the added security provided by the margrave’s presence was definitely 
beneficial to local transhumant pastoralists.72 As a matter of fact, the seventeenth-century 
author Giacomo Filippo Tomasini, who wrote an extensive chorography of Istria, noted 
that the date of annual livestock migration from the wider Buzet area to the nearby Karstic 
mountains was fixed at exactly the 24th of June.73 Whether the migration had tradition-
ally taken place on the feast day of Saint John even before the fair was privileged, or if the 
migration day became fixed on that specific day only following the institution of the fair, 
cannot be precisely determined. It can be ascertained, however, that the institutional sup-
port of Buzet’s fair on Saint John’s feast day definitely benefited the regional transhumance 
and provided a beneficial added security to the highways leading from Karstic region to 
the Buzet area. 
Closely connected to the strengthening of regalian rights over public roads is another 
seminal feature of Bertrand’s policy of privileging local and regional markets: the affirma-
tion of the central government’s jurisdiction over the privileged subject centers. Market 
duction of Judicial Space in the Margraviate of Istria: Aspects of Continuity and Change Following the Introduction of 
Venetian Jurisdiction (1421),” medium Aevum Quotidianum, 74, 2017, 58–59.
70 G. Bianchi, Documenti, doc. no. 3269. Italian toponym for Bovec is Plezzo. See also G. Brunettin, “L’evoluzione impos-
sibile,” 199, fn. 558; P. Paschini, sdF, 478; G. Brunettin, Bertrando di saint-Geniès, 537, fn. 186.
71 P. Štih, i conti di Gorizia, 157; G. Brunettin, Bertrando di saint-Geniès, 733. More on public roads in the medieval Patriar-
chate of Aquileia in D. Degrassi, “L’economia del tardo medioevo,” 307–29, esp. the map showing all the important routes 
on 321–322.
72 Regional fairs often coincided with the annual migration of livestock and this is also the case with Buzet’s fair. Andre 
Allix, “The Geography of Fairs: Illustrated by Old-World Examples,” Geographical review, 12, no. 4, 1922, 548–550; S. 
Epstein, “Fairs,” 76. 
73 “Nelle montagne [near Buzet] sono copiosissimi i pascoli, non solo per il paese, ma anco pre gli animali dell’Istria infe-
riore, che ogni anno vengono l’estate a questi pascoli dai 24 di giugno fino alli 25 di agosto, dalle quali montagne ne cava 
l’eccellentissimo capitano [the captain of Rašpor] 500 ducati d’affitto all’anno.” Giacomo Filippo Tomasini, “De Com-
mentarii storici-geografici della provincia dell’Istria libri otto con appendice,” At, 4, 1837, 523.
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privileges are in essence a gift, and a gift always obliges.74 In a typical do ut des paradigm, 
the privileged community is to repay the grantor’s generosity with undeterred fidelity, obe-
dience and support. Thus, market privileges create and (re)affirm a symbiotic relationship 
between the central government and the subject community. Consequently, every period 
of noticeable proliferation of market privileges is “a consequence of the rise of more pow-
erful territorial and national states.”75 As the leading authority on European medieval fairs 
argues, “grants were part of a broader strategy that aimed to assert the state’s legal, fiscal 
and political prerogatives over regalian rights”76; this was exactly the main characteristic of 
Bertrand’s entire political program. All Bertrand’s privileges can be read through the optics 
of strengthening the central government and promoting mutually complimentary relations 
with the privileged centers. This is especially the case with Venzone, a previously hostile 
community that was defeated in a military campaign, and Lož, a newly revendicated pos-
session of the Aquileian Church.77
With regard to the Margraviate of Istria, it is very probable that the amount of four hun-
dred and fifty marks Bertrand paid to the countess Beatrice for the terre et castra nostra 
istrie included Buzet as well. If that was the case, the 1336 privilege is a welcome back gift, a 
privilege aimed at reestablishing ties severed by the expansionism of the counts of Gorizia 
and their ministerials. If, on the other hand, Buzet remained outside the reach of the Aq-
uileian advocates throughout the turbulent vacuum of power period—the years between 
the death of Henry II of Gorizia (1323), the sede vacante episode in the Patriarchate (the 
death of Pagano della Torre in 1332), and the beginning of Bertrand’s rule (1334)—then the 
privilege reads as a reward to the community for its unwavering fidelity towards the Aqui-
leian Church. In any case, the grant was meant to reaffirm and reinforce the ties between 
the central government—in 1336 in its phase of energetic jurisdictional expansion—and 
the privileged community that was destined to become the very center of the reliquia reliq-
uiarum of the Margraviate of Istria. Buzet’s steadfast devotion to the Patriarchate following 
the issuing of the fair privilege was rewarded in the following years as the modest com-
munity became the very administrative center of Aquileian Istria, the seat of the margrave’s 
supreme court.78
Finally, Bertrand’s 1336 privilege to Buzet reveals some further distinctions between the 
Margraviate of Istria and Friuli with regard to the jurisdictional framework of the Patriar-
chate of Aquileia. The majority of the privileges issued by the prince-patriarch were direct-
ed towards weekly markets, not annual fairs. Moreover, Cividale already had an institution-
ally recognized weekly market, privileged already by patriarch Peregrine (Pellegrino) in the 
74 The classic account of gift-counter gift paradigm is Marcel Mauss, “Essai sur le don: Forme et raison de l’échange dans 
les sociétés archaiques,” L’année sociologique, 1, 1923-1924, 30–186. For a more contemporary account on gift-giving see 
Maurice Godelier, The enigma of the Gift, trans. Nora Scott, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.
75 S. Epstein, “Fairs,” 83.
76 Ibid., 83.
77 G. Brunettin, Bertrando di saint-Geniès, 309–312 (Venzone), 567 (Lož).
78 P. Kandler, cDi, vol. 3, doc. no. 807; J. Banić, “Production of Judicial Space,” 57–58. Muggia was not officially a part of the 
Margraviate; it was constituted as an urban commune directly under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate’s central govern-
ment. On medieval Muggia see Franco Colombo, storia di muggia: il comune Aquileiese, Trieste: Libreria internazionale 
“Italo Svevo,” 1970.
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twelfth century and confirmed by patriarch Ulrich II in 1176.79 There are sources attesting 
to regular (weekly?) markets taking place inside Buzet’s walls as well. It was Bertrand who 
regulated this type of commercial activity by fixing the auctioning period to three days, but 
this market was neither privileged nor put under the jurisdictional authority of any sort of 
public official.80 Conversely, weekly markets in Friuli were under the jurisdictional author-
ity of gastalds, public officials nominated by the central government serving a fixed term 
in office.81 In the Margraviate of Istria, the administrative structure was different: the only 
public official nominated by the central government was the delegated margrave. This office 
was bought from the central government for a price ranging between 300 florins and 1000 
pounds of small denari. The buyer, who still had to be approved by the patriarch, would be 
granted the office for a fixed term, usually one or two years, as well as the right to all the 
incomes from the Margraviate, including taxes, tolls and fines from the administration of 
justice.82 The administration of the subject communities was in turn governed by the local 
gastalds and župans (also called merigas) along with the local councils made up of distin-
guished members of the community.83 Thus, the Aquileian communities of the Margraviate 
of Istria were one step further removed from the central government of the Patriarchate in 
comparison to their Friulian counterparts; the margrave stood as an intermediary between 
the local gastalds and the patriarch’s curia. Consequently, if the patriarch wanted to bestow 
his jurisdictional support to any community in the Istrian margraviate, he could rely solely 
on the margrave, his only formal official in the region. Since the margrave performed his 
authority itinerantly—by visiting each town personally several times throughout his term, 
usually on the fixed dates negotiated with the communities—this representative could not 
act as the official institutional support for a weekly event.84 This is the main reason behind 
the decision to privilege a yearly event as the margrave could not, due to the nature of 
his office, oversee a weekly market. This was likewise the case in Pontebba, a possession 
under the temporal jurisdiction of the monastery of Moggio, where the patriarch also did 
not have a permanently stationed official and therefore privileged an annual fair.85 These 
conclusions further the argument that the Aquileian Margraviate of Istria was indeed on its 
way to becoming an “appendix” to the ecclesiastical principality, further removed from the 
79 B. De Rubeis, meA, cols. 597–598; P. Paschini, sdF, 277.
80 “Decetero bestie ac bona alia que in terram nostram Pinguenti ad vendendum conducentur, per alios quam per notos 
mercatores, tribus diebus continuis super platea dicte terre nostre apud ecclesiam publice debeant incantari, et postquam 
fuerint taliter incantate, venditionem fiendam de ipsis plenam habere volumus roboris firmitatem.” P. Kandler, cDi, vol. 
3, doc. no. 655.
81 On the gastalds in Friuli see P. S. Leicht, Parlamento friulano, vol. 1, XXIV–XXVI. It should be noted that Leicht’s claim 
that in 1360 the office of the Istrian margrave had been leased for 1000 marks should be corrected to 1000 pounds of 
small denari (125 marks).
82 On the Margraves see Gian Rinaldo Carli, Delle antichità italiche, vol. 4, Milan: Imperial Monistero di S. Ambrogio Mag-
giore, 1790, 258–262; Carlo Buttazioni, “Dei governatori d’Istria a nome dei marchesi principi i patriarchi d’Aquileia,” 
At, ser. 2, 2, 1870-1871, 245–251; Vincenzo Joppi, “Saggio di serie dei marchesi-governatori dell’Istria per i patriarchi di 
Aquileia Marchesi-principi,” At, ser. 2, 2, 1870-1871, 252–254; Josip Banić, “Pinguente: Bastione inespugnabile dell’Istria 
continentale,” in Buzetski statut / statuto di Pinguente, ed. Nella Lonza and Branka Poropat, Kolana od statuti / Collana 
degli Statuti 4, Buzet: Grad Buzet, 2017, 137–139.
83 J. Banić, “Pinguente,” 136–137.
84 Vincenzo Joppi, “Diritti di Aquileia nel Marchesato d’Istria (anno 1381),” At, ser. 2, 9, no. 1–2, 1883, 195–199.
85 P. Paschini, sdF, 687.
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central government than Friulian possessions and governed much more flexibly through 
the office of an itinerant margrave.
Finally, it can be concluded that while the economic component unmistakably prompt-
ed the issuing of Bertrand’s market privileges, political factors played a seminal role as 
well. One can thus only agree with the informed opinion of Stephan R. Epstein that “the 
economic and the political aspects of fair foundations were therefore strongly related.”86 
Not only did Bertrand’s policy affect the entire ecclesiastical principality, both in terms of 
boosting the volume of trade and securing the public roads, but his fair privilege to Buzet 
had a considerable effect on this modest town and the northern Margraviate of Istria. The 
local community was bestowed with institutional protection and an additional source of 
income, the transhumant population benefited from safer roads during the period of mi-
gration to the mountain regions and the symbiotic ties between the central government 
and the privileged town promoted by Bertrand’s grant soon resulted in Buzet’s rising status 
as the capital of the entire Istrian margraviate. Thus, not only Saint John, but the feast day 
of Blessed Bertrand de Saint-Geniès, should also be celebrated in this quintessential Aqui-
leian bastion of the Istrian peninsula. 
86 S. Epstein, Freedom and Growth, 74.
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Appendix 1
Bertrand’s charter privileging an annual fair on the feast day of Saint John (24th of June) 
in Buzet.
Udine, 10th of June, 1336.
Croatian State Archive in Pazin, Zbirka Isprava [Collection of charter], HR-DAPA 797-15
Notes on transcription: No interventions to the text have been made other than the intro-
duction of modern capitalization and punctuation signs, the rendering of the letter “u” as a 
“v” when standing for a consonant, and the rendering of all the cases of “i lunga” as an “i”.
Sancte sedis Aquilegensis Dei gratia patriarcha Bertrandus notum fore volumus universis, 
quod cum inter alios nobis et nostre Aquilegensi Ecclesie subiectos de partibus Istrie dilec-
tos fideles nostros comune et homines de Pinguento prosequamur benevolentia speciali, et 
propterea volentes ipsos dotare prerogativa gratie et honoris eisdem comuni et hominibus 
pro honore, utilitate et commodo ipsorum, mercatum publicum et universale faciendum 
perpetuo singulis annis in festo Beati Iohannis Baptiste de mense Iunii ac duraturum ipso 
festo et duobus diebus immediate sequentibus ad modum nundinarum prope ecclesiam 
Sancti Iohannis sitam iuxta mollendina de Pinguento tenore presencium de speciali gra-
cia duximus concedendum, ita quod medietas mute que exigetur in dicto mercato nobis 
et Aquilegensi Ecclesie applicetur et alia medietas comuni dicti loci de Pinguento, statu-
entes et ordinantes quod universi undecumque existant et cuiuscumque condicionis, dum 
tamen non sint publici latrones vel baniti Patriarchatus Aquilegensis, venientes ad huius-
modi mercatum sive nundinas sint salvi et securi cum omnibus bonis et rebus suis et sub 
protectione nostra et marchionis nostri Istrie veniendo, stando et redeundo, non obstanti-
bus quibuscumque represalliis alicui persone quacumque occasione vel sub qua vis forma 
verborum concessis, necnon mandantes nostri marchioni Istrie vel eius vicecomiti seu eius 
vicario, qui pro tempore fuerit, quod predictum mercatum seu nundinas diligenter debeat 
custodire. In cuius rei testimonium presentes fieri iussimus nostri sigilli appensione mu-
nitas. Datum Utini in nostro patriarchali palatio die decimo mensis Iunii, anno dominice 
nativitatis millesimo trecentesimo tricesimo sexto, indictione quarta.
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Appendix 2
Translation of Bertrand’s fair privilege to Buzet in modern English
We Bertrand, by the grace of God the patriarch of the Holy See of Aquileia, wish that it 
be known to all that among those subject to us and to our Church of Aquileia in Istria, we 
favor our beloved faithful subjects, the commune and the people of Buzet, with special be-
nevolence. Therefore, wanting to endow them with a privilege of our grace and honour, by 
the present document and with special grace we thought it appropriate to grant to the said 
commune and the people, for their honour, advantage and benefit, a public and universal 
market, every year in perpetuity in the form of a fair by the church of Saint John next to 
the mills of Buzet, on the feast day of Saint John the Baptist in the month of June, lasting 
that feast day and the two following days, so that one half of the tolls levied in this market 
be disbursed to us and the Church of Aquileia, and the other half to the said commune of 
Buzet. We decree and order that all those who come to this market or fair, from wherever 
they may be and whatever their status—as long as they are not public thieves or banished 
from the Patriarchate of Aquileia—may be free and safe to come, attend, and return with 
all their goods and possessions, under our protection and that of our Istrian margrave, not-
withstanding whatsoever reprisals granted in whatever terms, to any others on whatever 
other occasion. We furthermore order our margrave of Istria, or his viscount, or his vicar, 
whoever he may be at the time, that he should diligently safeguard the said market or fair. 
In testimony of this deed we have ordered the present charter to be strengthened by the 
appending of our seal. Given in Udine, in our patriarchal palace, on the tenth of June, the 
year of our Lord’s birth 1336, fourth indiction.
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SAŽETAK
Pro honore, utilitate et commodo: markgrofovija Istra i sajamski privilegiji 
akvilejskog patrijarha Bertranda de Saint-genièsa (1334. – 1350.)
Rad analizira sajmeni privilegij buzetske komune koji je izdao akvilejski patrijarh Ber-
trand de Saint-Geniès desetog lipnja 1336. godine. Autor tvrdi da je povelja imala nekoliko 
međusobno komplementarnih svrha koje dolaze na vidjelo tek ukoliko se izvor sagleda 
unutar šireg konteksta Bertrandovog cjelokupnog političkog i ekonomskog programa. 
Uspoređujući buzetski privilegij sa sličnim poveljama koje je tijekom svoje burne vlada-
vine izdao ovaj istaknuti prelat, zaključuje se da je analizirani dokument dodijeljen kako 
iz ekonomskih, tako i iz političkih razloga. S jedne strane, povelja predstavlja samo jedan 
u nizu trgovinskih privilegija koje je princ-patrijarh Bertrand podijelio s ciljem povećanja 
obujma trgovinske razmjene te protoka novaca i dobara diljem svoje svjetovne države, no 
s druge strane, listina promiče uzajamno korisne i tješnje odnose između centralne vlasti 
i zajednice podanika kojoj je povlastica izdana. Autor ističe nekoliko čimbenika na koje 
je buzetski privilegij pozitivno utjecao poput viših prihoda za centralnu vlast i lokalnu 
komunu, te sigurnijih prometnica za vrijeme sezonskih migracija regionalnih transhu-
mantnih stočara. Na kraju se otkrivaju posebnosti Markgrofovije Istre u odnosu na os-
tale posjede akvilejskih patrijarha koje se iščitavaju usporednom analizom Bertrandovih 
trgovinskih povlastica. Na taj se način zaključuje da je akvilejska Istra već u ovom razdoblju 
započela transformaciju u “privjesak” Akvilejskog patrijarhata; za razliku od Furlanije, od 
druge polovice 14. st. Istarska markgrofovija više neće biti smatrana konstitutivnim posje-
dom ovog osebujnog crkvenog gospodstva. Rad završava novom transkripcijom buzetskog 
privilegija i prijevodom listine na suvremeni engleski jezik.
